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Experimental investigations of ambiguity: The case of most * 
 
 
Abstract   
 
In the study of natural language quantification, much recent attention has been devoted to the 
investigation of verification procedures associated with the proportional quantifier most (e.g. 
Hackl, 2009; Lidz, Pietroski, Hunter and Halberda, 2011; Solt, 2011; Kotek, Sudo, Howard and 
Hackl, 2011; Pietroski, Lidz, Hunter, Odic and Halberda, 2012; Kotek, Sudo, Howard and Hackl, 
2012). The aim of these studies is to go beyond the traditional characterization of the semantics 
of most, which is confined to explicating its truth-functional and presuppositional content as well 
as its combinatorial properties, as these aspects underdetermine the correct analysis of most.  
The present paper contributes to this effort by presenting new experimental evidence in 
support of a decompositional analysis of most according to which it is a superlative construction 
built from a gradable predicate many or much and the superlative operator -est,  (Hackl, 2009). 
Our evidence comes in the form of verification profiles for sentences like Most of the dots are 
blue which, we argue, reflect the existence of a superlative reading of most. This contrasts 
notably with Lidz et al.'s (2011) results. To reconcile the two sets of data, we argue, it is 
necessary to take important differences in the task demands into account, which impose limits on 
the conclusions that can be drawn based on these studies.  
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1. Introduction: Most in subject position 
 
It is well-known that most in object position has both proportional uses, in which case it 
appears in its bare form and can be reasonably well paraphrased using more than half, (1a), and 
superlative uses similar to the reading that is obtained when most combines with certain kinds of 
degree predicates (e.g. most expensive car). In those cases, most is accompanied by the definite 
article, (1b) (Bresnan 1973).1 
 
(1) a.  John talked to most of the students.      proportional  
           ≈  John talked to more than half of the students 
 b. John talked to the most students.       superlative 
  ≈  John talked to more students than anybody else 
 
                                                      
* Acknowledgements to be added.  
1 Bare most can also occur outside of the partitive frame, as in (i) below, and in that case the sentence tends to have a 
generic interpretation. We will not discuss such uses in the present paper.  See Matthewson (2001) and Szabolsci 
(2012) for a discussion.  
 
(i) Most linguists are millionaires.  (Matthewson 2001, example 47). 
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There have been several attempts in the literature to relate the two uses of most (e.g. Pinkham 
1985, Yabushita 1999, Hackl 2009, Krasikova 2011, Szabolsci 2012), but the canonical view 
among them is that this is a case of lexical ambiguity, with bare most a quantificational 
determiner (Barwise and Cooper 1981), and the most a superlative construction (e.g. Szabolcsi 
1986).2 
When most occurs in subject position, it has been noted that only bare most is grammatical. 
The most is degraded and even ungrammatical for many speakers, (2).3  
 
(2) a. Most of the students talked to John. 
b. ??The most students talked to John. 
 
The range of possible interpretations available to bare most in subject position as well as the 
associated verification strategies have become a central topic of debate in recent years. More 
specifically, while it is uncontroversial that bare most in subject position can give rise to 
proportional truth-conditions similar to the ones expressed by more than half, it has been argued 
in Hackl (2009) that the verification strategy associated with it is quite different from the one 
associated with more than half and reflects its superlative morpho-syntax. Moreover, Kotek et al. 
(2011) have argued that bare most in subject position is in fact ambiguous between a (preferred) 
proportional reading and a (latent) superlative reading. This contrasts markedly with Lidz et al. 
(2011), who conduct a sentence verification study of bare most to adjudicate between different 
ways of describing the truth-conditional import of bare most. Lidz et al. assume that bare most is 
unambiguously proportional and, indeed, their results provide no indication that bare most might 
have any properties shared with the most, although they do not explicitly discuss the latter. In 
light of these considerations, Lidz et al. propose an analysis of bare most that makes the 
prediction that bare most in subject position only gives rise to proportional truth-conditions.  
The present paper presents novel experimental evidence which supports an analysis of most, 
according to which both the most and bare most are built from the same basic ingredients – a 
gradable predicate many/much and the superlative operator -est – but project different LFs, as 
e.g. in Hackl (2009). It also argues that the seemingly conflicting set of empirical results from 
previous studies can be understood within this structural view of most once the differences in 
experimental techniques employed by the various researchers are properly factored in. The paper 
is composed as follows: In section 2 we briefly review the debate between the approach that 
views most as a lexical primitive and the approach which views most as a complex superlative 
construction. In Section 3 we present novel data from two experiments that support the view that 
most is uniformly a superlative construction. Section 4 discusses the implications of the results 
for the theory of most, differences between the determiners most and more than half that arise 
                                                      
2 See Szabolcsi 2010 for a review of the history of this debate.  
3 The extent to which the most in subject position is degraded is subject to grammatical factors as well as dialectal 
variation. E.g. Kotek et al. (2011b) provide data like (i) that most native speakers of English find acceptable.  
 
 (i) Where do the most students live?  
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from the experiments, and also previous work on most, notably the work in Lidz et al. (2011), 
which used a very similar experiment but reported very different findings about the nature of 
most than we report in this paper. We address several concerns regarding the experiment in Lidz 
et al. (2011) and the conclusions that were drawn based on this work.  
 
2. Background: Two theories of most 
 
As we saw in (1a-b), most in object position has proportional and superlative uses. The 
availability of these two readings seems to correlate with the presence or absence of the definite 
article: bare most gives rise to a proportional reading, while the most produces a superlative 
reading.  
The canonical take on these facts, implicit e.g. in Barwise and Cooper (1981), is to assume 
that this is akin to a lexical ambiguity. That is, there are two unrelated mosts: bare most is a 
lexical determiner while the most is a superlative construction built from a gradable predicate 
such as many or much and the superlative morpheme -est. A recent version of such a view for 
bare most is proposed in Lidz et al. (2011), (3b). On this analysis, bare most is analyzed as a 
quantificational determiner that takes two set-denoting expressions A and B and yields true only 
if the number of As that are Bs is greater than the number of As minus the number of As that are 
Bs. This holds just in case there are more As that are Bs than there are As that are not Bs or, 
equivalently, more than half of the As are Bs.4   
 
(3) a. John talked to most of the students. 
 b. ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A 
 c. ⟦John talked to most of the students⟧ = 1 iff |{x: x is a student}x: John talked to 
x}{x: x is a student} |{x: x is a student}x: John talked to x} 
 
The superlative reading of the most, by contrast, is canonically analyzed as a construction 
that involves degree quantification, with the superlative morpheme -est denoting a degree 
quantifier that is restricted by a comparison class C, which, in the case of (4a) contains 
contextually salient alternatives to John. (4a) is true only if there is a plurality of students that 
John talked to that is more numerous than any plurality of students talked to by any contextually 
salient individual different from John (Heim 1985, Szabolcsi 1986).5  
 
(4) a. John talked to the most students. 
                                                      
4 Traditionally, the semantics of most is described as in (i) below, which is truth-conditionally equivalent to the one 
in (3b). We discuss this notation and the difference between most and more than half in more detail in section 4.  
 
(i) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |A
 
5 To avoid potentially distracting clutter, we ignore in our formulas the difference between sets and pluralities 
whenever the distinction is immaterial to the discussion. For instance, the symbol for the ‘the cardinality of’ 
function, | . |, is used for both sets and pluralities.  
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 b. ⟦John talked to the most students⟧ = 1 iff dX[students(X) & John talked to X & |X|d & 
yC[yJohn  Y[students(Y) & y talked to Y & |Y|d]] 
 
On the structural view, both the proportional and the superlative readings of most are 
analyzed as superlative constructions. The proposal in Hackl (2009) analyzes the superlative 
reading of most essentially as in (4) above. The proportional reading, on the other hand, is 
analyzed as in (5).6  
 
(5) a. John talked to most of the students.   
b. ⟦John talked to most of the students⟧ = 1 iff dX[students(X) & John talked to X & |X| 
≥d & YC [students (Y) & YX  |Y|<d]] 
 
(5b) is parallel to (4b) except that (i) the comparison class C is assumed to be the set of student 
pluralities rather than the set of contextually relevant people who talked to students and (ii) non-
identity is assumed to hold between any two alternatives in C if they are non-overlapping 
pluralities of students. The symbol  is used to represent the no-overlap relation, which replaces 
the non-identity relation ≠ of (4b). (5a) is true just in case there is a plurality of students, X, that 
John talked to that is more numerous than all student pluralities that have no overlap with X. 
This amounts to demanding that there be a plurality of students that John talked to that is more 
numerous than the student plurality that John did not talk to. Thus, (5a) expresses proportional 
truth-conditions even though it is analyzed as a superlative construction. It is true just in case 
John talked to more than half of the students.7  
The lexical view of most and the structural view of most make diverging predictions with 
regard to the ability of bare most to take on a superlative reading.  Consider a case where bare 
most occurs in subject position, as in (6a). The semantic analyses assumed for such a sentence by 
the lexical view and the structural view are given in (6b-c), respectively.  
 
(6) a. Most of the dots are blue. 
b. ⟦Most of the dots are blue⟧ = 1 iff | Dots BlueDots | Dots  Blue 
c. ⟦Most of the dots are blue⟧ = 1 iff dX[Dots(X)  Blue(X)  |X|≥d & YC 
         [Dots(Y) & YX  |Y|<d]] 
 
Under the lexical view of most, (6a) should only have proportional truth-condition, (7a). 
Under the structural ambiguity approach to most, however, which truth-conditions are expressed 
                                                      
6 Throughout this paper, we abstract away from the logical forms corresponding to proportional and superlative 
truth-conditions – see Hackl (2009) as well as Krasikova (2011), Kotek et al. (2011), Szabolcsi (2012), and 
Pancheva (forthcoming) among others for details and discussion – and simply use descriptions of truth-conditions 
such as those in (4)b and (5)b as short-hand. 
7 To ensure that (5b) does not express “absolute” truth-conditions, which would be paraphrasable by all the students, 
it needs to be assumed that C contains at least two distinct student pluralities. Hackl (2009) argues that this is due to 
a presupposition of the superlative operator.  
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depends on the content of the comparison class, C. If C is identified with the extension of the 
plural NP dots, i.e. closed under individual sum formation (Link 1983), proportional truth-
conditions result. This is because all dot pluralities different from the blue dots – whether they 
are homogenous in color or not – need to be less numerous than the blue dots for the sentence to 
be true. However, if C is not closed under individual sum formation but further constrained e.g. 
so that only homogenously colored dot pluralities are included (as proposed in Kotek et al. 
(2011a), (6c) only requires that the blue dots outnumber each of the non-blue dot pluralities 
separately rather than having to outnumber the non-blue dots as a whole. Under such a construal 
of C, then, (6a) expresses superlative truth-conditions, (7b).8 
 
(7) a. Proportional truth-conditions 
 |blue dots| > |non-blue dots|  
b. Superlative truth-conditions 
   For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots| > |Z dots| 
 
To see more concretely how (7a-b) diverge, consider the dot arrays in Figures 1-2. According 
to the proportional truth-conditions, (7a), Most of the dots are blue is true just in case more than 
half of the dots in the array are blue. An example of such an array is given in Figure 1, where the 
9 blue dots comprise more than half of all the dots and consequently outnumber the non-blue 
dots. Note that both the lexical view of most and the structural view of most make the same 
prediction about the verification of most with regard to Figure 1: speakers should judge the 
sentence as true in this figure.  
 
 
Fig. 1 Most of the dots are blue is true under both readings 
 
The two theories make diverging predictions about the verification of most statements with 
regard to dot arrays as in Figure 2. This array contains 7 blue dots, 4 red dots and 4 yellow dots. 
Hence, there are more non-blue dots than blue dots. The lexical view of most assigns only 
proportional truth-conditions to the statement Most of the dots are blue and therefore predicts 
that it should be judged false. Under the structural view of most, on the other hand, Most of the 
dots are blue has a superlative reading in addition to the proportional reading, and that reading is 
true in Figure 2. In particular, under the superlative reading of most the number of blue dots is 
                                                      
8 Here and throughout, we use Blue dots to refer to the target set that is mentioned in the most statement and Yellow 
dots and Red dots to refer to members of the complement set (non-Blue set). We use the term ‘most statement’ to 
refer to a sentence that has most in subject position, e.g. Most of the dots are blue., and ‘more than half statement’ to 
refer to the sentence More than half of the dots are blue.  
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compared to the number of red dots and to the number of yellow dots separately. Since in both 
comparisons the blue set comes out as more numerous than the competitor, the sentence is true. 
Therefore while the lexical view of most predicts that speakers will verify the most statement as 
false, the structural view of most allows speakers to verify the most statement as either true or 
false with regard to Figure 2. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Most of the dots are blue only true under superlative reading 
 
In the remainder of this paper we will refer to pictures as in Figure 2, which are true only 
under the superlative reading of most, as ‘superlative’ pictures or pictures in the ‘superlative’ 
condition. We will use the term ‘superlative verification strategy’ to refer to the idea that 
speakers verify a sentence according to superlative truth-conditions, and the term ‘proportional 
verification strategy’ to refer to the idea that they verify a sentence according to proportional 
truth-conditions. 
Two previous studies, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek et al. (2011a) have experimentally studied 
the behavior of most in subject position in sentences such as Most of the dots are blue, where the 
sentence is verified against a picture containing blue dots and dots in other colors, in various 
configurations. Despite many similarities between the studies, they obtained very different 
results: Kotek et al. (2011a) find that most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional 
reading and a latent superlative reading. The results of Lidz et al.’s (2011) study, on the other 
hand, are consistent with most only having a proportional reading.9 Below we present results of a 
new study that supports the conclusion that bare most in subject position has a superlative 
reading. This finding provides evidence against the lexical view under which most and the most 
are unrelated lexical items. It lends further support to theories such as the one proposed in Hackl 
(2009), under which most and the most are both superlative constructions consisting of a silent 
degree predicate MANY and the superlative morpheme –est.10 In Section 4.3 we address the 
                                                      
9 Again, we note that Lidz et al. (2011) do not directly test the existence or absence of the superlative reading, since 
it is assumed not to exist. Rather, Lidz et al. are concerned with the enumeration of homogeneously colored subsets 
of the non-blue set – which we will show below is necessary for the calculation of superlative truth-conditions – for 
other reasons. Their own motivation aside, the experimental manipulations in Lidz et al. are able to test for the 
presence of the superlative reading and their results are consistent with no such reading being used by the 
participants in their experiment.  
10 An anonymous reviewer provides additional evidence in support of the existence of a superlative reading of most 
in subject position, in the form of naturally occurring data such as the following:  
 
(i) Most respondents (34%) live in the South, followed by 24% in the Midwest, 23% in the West, and 17% in 
the Northeast.  
(http://www.ormanager.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/ORM_1013_p.22_ASC_Survey.pdf) 
 
 7 
 
source for the diverging results of Lidz et al. (2011) and those obtained in Kotek et al. (2011a) 
and in the current study. 
 
3. Current Experiments 
 
As mentioned above, two previous studies of most, Lidz et al. (2011) and Kotek et al. (2011a) 
use similar methodologies to study the behavior of bare most in subject position. Both studies 
test the verification of most statements with respect to dot-arrays whose properties are 
manipulated in various ways. The experiments in this section aim to combine the manipulations 
in the two previous studies to provide conclusive evidence as to the nature of bare most.  
In particular, we use a COLOR manipulation (used in both previous studies), allowing us to 
create dot-arrays in the ‘superlative’ condition. We combine this with a WEBER RATIO 
manipulation used in Lidz et al. (2011) but not in Kotek et al (2011a): under this manipulation, 
the relative sizes of the Blue set and the non-Blue set are varied. Verification of most statements 
has been shown by Lidz et al. (2011) to be sensitive to Weber’s law (see also Heim et al. 2012; 
cf. Tomaszewicz 2011 for relevant work on Polish), which governs the discriminability of two 
quantities, (Pica et al. 2004). Specifically, Lidz et al. (2011) showed that the accuracy of the 
verification of most statements increases gradually as the ratio of Blue:non-Blue dots in an array 
increases. Lastly, we add a DETERMINER manipulation used in Kotek et al. (2011a) but not in 
Lidz et al. (2011): we compare the verification of most to that of more than half, which is 
unambiguously proportional. The canonical analysis of more than half is given in (8). Under the 
lexical approach to most, (6b), more than half is truth-conditionally equivalent to bare most: both 
unambiguously have only proportional truth-conditions and are true and false in exactly the same 
circumstances. Under the structural ambiguity approach to most, (6c), on the other hand, most 
has a reading which more than half lacks –– the superlative reading –– and hence the two 
determiners are predicted to behave differently under the ‘superlative’ condition: more than half 
will be unambiguously false, but most will have a true reading.   
 
(8) ⟦more than half⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff |AB| > ½ |A| 
 
Finally, the experiments presented here follow Kotek et al. (2011a) in imposing no 
constraints on how long participants can see the dot-array in a trial or on how much time they 
take to make their True/False decision. This diverges from the methodology of Lidz et al. (2011), 
who only present the dot-arrays to their subjects for 150ms. In Section 4.3 we discuss the 
implications of this choice, which we believe are crucial for understanding the differences 
between the results obtained by the two previous studies of most.  
 
3.1. Experiment 1 
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This experiment provides baseline data on the use of an experimental design that combines the 
WEBER RATIO manipulation of Lidz et al. (2011) with the DETERMINER manipulation of Kotek 
et al. (2011a). In particular, we are interested in (a) establishing the behavior of more than half 
with regard to dot arrays of varying Weber ratios, and (b) understanding how participants verify 
most and more than half when the time allotted to the task is not restricted. 
 
3.1.1. Methods and materials 
 
In each trial in Experiment 1, participants were shown a picture containing 20-21 dots and a 
sentence describing that picture. Participants were asked to judge whether what the sentence said 
was true or false of the picture. Target trials were paired with one of the two statements in (9)-
(10), where, as in the Lidz et al. (2011) study, the sentence was always about the blue dots. 
DETERMINER was a between-subject factor: participants saw only most statements or only more 
than half statements, and those statements were paired with the exact same pictures across 
conditions.  
  
(9) Most of the dots are blue  
(10) More than half of the dots are blue  
 
All the pictures in Experiment 1 contained Blue and Yellow dots. Table 1 indicates the 
number of Blue and Yellow dots and the Blue:Yellow ratio for the 9 target trials in Experiment 
1. Weber ratios  1, where the truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that the 
statements in (9)-(10) are false (“false-ratios”), are colored in gray. Weber ratios > 1, where the 
truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that the statements in (9)-(10) are true (“true-
ratios”), are colored in white.  
 
8:12 
(0.67) 
9:12 
(0.75) 
9:11 
(0.82) 
10:11 
(0.91) 
10:10 
(1) 
11:10 
(1.1) 
11:9 
(1.22) 
12:9 
(1.33) 
12:8 
(1.5) 
  Table 1: Blue:Yellow dots and ratios in Experiment 1. 
 
The 9 target figures used in the experiment are shown in Figure 3. In addition to the 9 target 
trials, Experiment 1 contained 24 filler trials. 8 of the filler items contained the determiner more 
than n for different numbers n, and 8 contained the determiner many and 8 contained the 
determiner more than n% or more than n/m for different ns and ms. In half of the filler trials, the 
correct answer was true and in the other half it was false.11 The items were presented in one of 
two pseudo-randomized orders where each pair of target items was separated by at least one 
filler item, and the first item was not a target item. 
                                                      
11 The pictures associated with many and with the proportional determiners were generated so as to clearly match the 
expressed truth-conditions in the True condition and to clearly not match them in the False condition. That this 
manipulation was successful was verified by a post-hoc inspection of accuracy of the filler items, detailed in the 
results section below. 
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             FALSE 
8:12 
(0.67) 
9:12 
(0.75) 
9:11 
(0.82) 
10:11 
(0.91) 
10:10 
(1) 
 
            TRUE 
11:10 
(1.1) 
11:9 
(1.22) 
12:9 
(1.33) 
12:8 
(1.5) 
Fig. 3 Dot arrays of target items in Experiment 1 
 
The survey, randomization process, and the HTML templates used for this experiment were 
created using the turktools software (Erlewine and Kotek, 2013). The survey was posted on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid at the rate of $0.20 for their participation. 
They were asked to indicate their native language, but payment was not contingent on their 
response.  
 
3.1.2. Results 
 
195 native speakers of English participated in this study.12 97 subjects participated in the ‘most’ 
condition and 98 participated in the ‘more than half’ condition. Four non-native speakers and one 
subject who did not report on their native language were excluded from the analysis. No subjects 
were excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (<75% on filler trials). Two filler 
items were excluded from the analysis because of low accuracy rates (<75% accuracy across all 
participants). The remaining 22 filler items had a mean accuracy of 97.3%.  The results are not 
changed if instead a threshold of 80% were chosen. 
Figure 4 shows the average percent of true responses to Most of the dots are blue and More 
than half of the dots are blue for the 9 ratios of Experiment 1 (N=195). We observe an inflection 
point: for false-ratios, the percent of True responses is near zero. For true-ratios, the percent of 
True responses is at 77% and 85% for most and more than half respectively for the ratio 1.1 and 
at 90% and nearly 100% for most and more than half respectively for all ratios above 1.1. 
 
                                                      
12 Here and in Experiment 2 results are reported for all native speakers of English, including those who speak a 
second language. The results do not change if only mono-lingual speakers are included in the analysis.  
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Fig. 4 Average percent of true responses in Experiment 1 (accuracy ≥ 75%) 
 
Importantly, we also observe an asymmetry between the behavior of most and more than 
half: Although the verification behavior of most is almost identical to that of more than half for 
all false-ratios, the two determiners come apart for true-ratios. We observe a parallel proportion 
of true judgments for most and more than half, with most consistently verified as true 5-7% less 
often than more than half.  
A mixed effects logit model was fit to the data.13 The model examines the effect of the 
WEBER RATIO (with 9 levels as specified in Table 1 above) as well as DETERMINER (most vs. 
more than half) on percent-true in Experiment 1. The random effect structure includes random 
intercepts for both subjects and items, and by-subject random slopes for the effects of WEBER 
RATIO.14 The fixed effects are summarized in the following table. The correlations among the 
fixed effects are all within ±0.3, with the exception of a strong correlation between the main 
effect of DETERMINER and its interaction with WEBER RATIOS.15  
 
 
                                                      
13 The models reported in the paper were fit using R and the R packages lme4 (Bates and Maechler, 2009). The 
DETERMINER predictor was contrast coded as follows: 
 
 (i)      DETERMINER:    Most = 0.5  More than half = -0.5 
 
Random effect structures in our models are the maximal ones supported by the data and log-likelihood tests 
comparing models with the effects to models from which they were removed (cf. Baayen, Davidson, and Bates, 
2008; Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily 2013).  
14 A more detailed model that includes slopes for the random effect of DETERMINER does not significantly improve 
the model fit compared to the model that does not include these slopes (χ2(3)= 4.7976, p=0.1872). 
15 A model that predicts percent-true in Experiment 1 from DETERMINER and TRUTH-CONDITIONS (predicting false 
for all Weber ratios  1 and true for all Weber ratios > 1 for both most and more than half) yields main-effects of 
these two predictors and no interaction. A model that predicts percent-true in Experiment 1 from DETERMINER, 
WEBER RATIOS and TRUTH-CONDITIONS did not converge because of strong co-linearity between the latter two 
predictors. The model that uses WEBER RATIOS as a predictor is more informative than the model that uses TRUTH-
CONDITIONS, given the design of Experiment 1. This model allows for pair-wise comparisons of the bahavior of 
participants at different ratios, as opposed to collapsing all different points and testing one cloud of noisier data. We 
concentrate therefore on this model rather than on the one that uses TRUTH-CONDITIONS in place of WEBER RATIOS.  
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Predictor Coefficient Standard Error p 
Intercept -20.599 1.600 <.001 
DETERMINER 4.923 2.597 0.0580 
WEBER RATIO  19.216 1.516 <.001 
DETERMINERWEBER RATIO -4.968 2.487 <.05 
Table 2: Summary of the fixed effects  
 
We find a main effect of WEBER RATIO and an interaction between WEBER RATIO and 
DETERMINER. Because of the strong co-linearity between the main effect of DETERMINER and 
the interaction of DETERMINER and WEBER RATIOS, we do not put any weight on the near-
significant main effect of DETERMINER found in this model. 
 
3.1.2. Discussion 
 
Experiment 1 yielded two important findings. First, the verification of most and more than half is 
sensitive to the Weber ratio such that arrays with ratios below 1 are judged false and arrays 
above 1 are judged true. This is, of course, just a reflection of the truth-conditional import of 
these determiners. Second, we find that although most and more than half are truth-conditionally 
equivalent in all target items of Experiment 1, the verification of the two determiners is notably 
different: most patterns with more than half for verification of items with ratios below and equal 
to 1: they are judged as true less than 10% of the time; for ratios above 1, on the other hand, most 
and more than half exhibit parallel behavior but most is judged as true on average 5-7% less 
often than more than half in all 4 true items. We return to this point in the discussion in Section 
4.1. To conclude, although the task demands are different in Experiment 1 compared to the task 
in Lidz et al. (2011), we find a similar effect of the WEBER RATIO on the verification of most. 
Experiment 2 builds in this finding by adding a COLOR manipulation to the WEBER RATIO 
manipulation.  
 
3.2. Experiment 2: Ratio-by-Color manipulation 
 
Experiment 2 expands on the results of Experiment 1 and explores the simultaneous effect of 
WEBER RATIO and COLOR on the verification of statements containing most and more than half. 
Pictures in this experiment have either two (Blue and Yellow) or three (Blue, Yellow and Red) 
colors. The presence of a third color in the picture is predicted to have an effect only on those 
determiners that can be evaluated using subsets of the non-Blue set separately. Consequently, 
more than half is expected not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation. Under the lexical view 
of most, most is also predicted not to be sensitive to the COLOR manipulation, because it only has 
a proportional reading. Under the structural view, most is predicted to be sensitive to the COLOR 
manipulation, because it has a superlative reading under which the Blue set is compared to the 
Yellow set and to the Red set separately. Moreover, a ‘superlative’ verification strategy of most 
is expected to be sensitive not only to the presence of multiple subsets of non-Blue dots, but also 
to their structure: following Weber’s law, a most statement is predicted to be more difficult to 
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verify against a picture with a Blue:Yellow:Red ratio of 10:10:1, compared to a picture with a 
ratio of 10:6:5, even though the overall Blue:non-Blue ratio is the same in both cases. To 
investigate this prediction Experiment 2 tests not only the effect of COLOR but also the effect of 
different WEBER RATIOS within the non-Blue set on the verification of most and more than half. 
 
3.2.1. Methods and materials 
 
Experiment 2 combines the DETERMINER and WEBER RATIO manipulations of Experiment 1 
with an additional COLOR manipulation: dot arrays in Experiment 2 either had two colors or 
three colors. We used three different ways of constructing 3-COLOR arrays by varying the ratios 
of Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red dots. In what follows, we will refer to these ratios as COLOR 
RATIOS. Pictures in the 2-COLOR condition contained Blue and Yellow dots, and pictures in the 
3-COLOR condition contained Blue, Yellow and Red dots. In the BALANCED condition, the 
Yellow and Red dots were split up evenly. In the MILDLY BALANCED condition, the dots were 
split up somewhat evenly, but with more Yellow than Red dots. In the UNBALANCED condition, 
pictures contained one Red dot and all the other non-Blue dots were Yellow. Pictures used 9 
different WEBER RATIOS: four below 1; one at exactly 1; and four above 1, all identical to those 
used in Experiment 1. These WEBER RATIOS were held constant across the 2-COLOR condition 
and the three 3-COLOR conditions. The overall number of dots in the pictures was again 20-21. 
The design of Experiment 2 is summarized in Table 3 below. Each row corresponds to one 
COLOR level (2C, 3C-UNBALANCED, 3C-MILDLY BALANCED, 3C-BALANCED). Each column 
represents one WEBER RATIO, indicated at the top of the column. The COLOR RATIO is 
manipulated in the different COLOR conditions, with a total of 26 different COLOR RATIOS 
distributed across the COLOR conditions. Each cell in Table 3 provides information about the 
numbers of Blue, Yellow and Red dots in that cell, and the COLOR RATIO of Blue:Yellow dots in 
the cell (in brackets). Note that for cells in the 2C condition, the COLOR RATIO is the same as the 
WEBER RATIO, since there is only one non-Blue color in those trials.  
 
              TC 
COLOR 
Proportional most : False 
 8:12         9:12         9:11           10:11        10:10 
Proportional most : True 
 11:10      11:9         12:9          12:8  
2C 8:12 
(0.67) 
9:12 
(0.75) 
9:11 
(0.82) 
10:11 
(0.91) 
10:10 
(1) 
11:10 
(1.1) 
11:9 
(1.22) 
12:9 
(1.33) 
12:8 
(1.5) 
3C 
UNBALANCED 
8:11:1 
(0.73) 
9:11:1 
(0.86) 
9:10:1 
(0.9) 
10:10:1 
(1) 
10:9:1 
(1.11) 
11:9:1 
(1.22) 
11:8:1 
(1.38) 
12:8:1 
(1.5) 
12:7:1 
(1.71) 
3C  MILDLY 
BALANCED 
8:9:3 
(0.89) 
9:9:3 
(1) 
9:8:3 
(1.13) 
10:8:3 
(1.25) 
10:7:3 
(1.42) 
11:7:3 
(1.57) 
11:6:3 
(1.83) 
12:7:2 
(1.71) 
12:6:2 
(2) 
3C 
BALANCED 
8:6:6 
(1.33) 
9:6:6 
(1.5) 
9:6:5 
(1.5) 
10:6:5 
(1.67) 
10:6:4 
(1.67) 
11:5:5 
(2.2) 
11:5:4 
(2.2) 
12:5:4 
(2.4) 
12:4:4 
(3) 
Table 3: Blue:Yellow:Red dots, and COLOR RATIOS (in brackets) in Experiment 2.  
 
In Table 3 there are four columns occurring on the right with WEBER RATIOS above 1 for 
which most is true under proportional (and hence also superlative) truth-conditions. In cells in 
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the first five columns on the left, most and more than half are false under proportional truth-
conditions. These cells are divided into two groups, as indicated by their shading: the gray 
shaded cells represent pictures for which most is also false under superlative truth-conditions. 
The white cells in the table represent ‘superlative’ pictures, which are false under proportional 
truth-conditions but true under superlative truth-conditions. These pictures contain dot arrays 
with WEBER RATIOS below 1 (as can be seen in the corresponding 2C cell in the same column), 
but COLOR RATIOS above 1, as the numbers in brackets in those cells show.  
The 36 target pictures used in Experiment 2 are given in Figure 5. Below each picture we 
indicate the numbers of Blue:Yellow:Red dots in the picture and the Blue:Yellow COLOR RATIO 
(in brackets) for that picture. For the 2C items, the same pictures were used as in Experiment 1. 
 
 
8:12 
(0.67) 
9:12 
(0.75) 
9:11 
(0.82) 
10:11 
(0.91) 
10:10 
(1) 
11:10 
(1.1) 
11:9 
(1.22) 
12:9 
(1.33) 
12:8 
(1.5) 
 
 
8:11:1 
(0.73) 
9:11:1 
(0.86) 
9:10:1 
(0.9) 
10:10:1 
(1) 
10:9:1 
(1.11) 
11:9:1 
(1.22) 
11:8:1 
(1.38) 
12:8:1 
(1.5) 
12:7:1 
(1.71) 
 
 
8:9:3 
(0.89) 
9:9:3 
(1) 
9:8:3 
(1.13) 
10:8:3 
(1.25) 
10:7:3 
(1.42) 
11:7:3 
(1.57) 
11:6:3 
(1.83) 
12:7:2 
(1.71) 
12:6:2 
(2) 
 
 
8:6:6 
(1.33) 
9:6:6 
(1.5) 
9:6:5 
(1.5) 
10:6:5 
(1.67) 
10:6:4 
(1.67) 
11:5:5 
(2.2) 
11:5:4 
(2.2) 
12:5:4 
(2.4) 
12:4:4 
(3) 
 
Fig. 5 Dot arrays of target items in Experiment 2 
 
We can make the following prediction: if most has a superlative reading – that is, if most can 
be verified using the COLOR RATIOS (Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red), instead of the WEBER RATIO 
(Blue:non-Blue), we expect speakers to judge most statements in the ‘superlative’ pictures as true 
more often than other pictures in the same column (i.e., pictures that have the same Weber ratio 
but are false under the superlative reading). Furthermore, this behavior should track Weber’s law 
similarly to the behavior we observed for the WEBER RATIOS in Experiment 1: higher COLOR 
RATIOS should be easier to verify than ratios that are closer to 1. On the other hand, if most only 
has a proportional reading, which is truth-conditionally equivalent to that of more than half, it 
should not be affected by the COLOR RATIOS. Under this approach we predict all cells in a given 
column in Table 3 to be similarly rated for most, and the same is expected for more than half as 
well. The predictions for the trials that are false under the proportional reading are summarized 
in (11) below.16  
                                                      
16 Both theories of most predict that trials that are true under the proportional reading will be judged by speakers as 
true: the superlative reading is entailed whenever proportional truth-conditions are satisfied.  
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(11) Predictions for Experiment 2 (5 columns on the left, where proportional most is false): 
a. More than half: No effect of COLOR.  
    All trials in columns 1-5 are false.  
b. Most – lexical view: No effect of COLOR. 
    All trials in columns 1-5 are false.  
c. Most – structural view: Effect of COLOR.  
2C: All trials in columns 1-5 are false.  
3C UNBALANCED: Trials in columns 1-4 are false; the trial in column 5 is true.  
3C MILDLY BALANCED: Trials in columns 1-2 are false; trials in columns 3-5 are true.  
3C BALANCED: All trials in columns 1-5 are true.  
 
 To test these predictions, target trials in Experiment 2 were paired with one of the two 
statements in (12)-(13), where the sentence was always about the Blue dots. As in Experiment 1, 
DETERMINER was a between-subject factor: participants verified the pictures shown in Figure 5 
either against most statements or against more than half statements (but no participant was given 
both most and more than half statements).  
  
(12) Most of the dots are blue  
(13) More than half of the dots are blue  
 
The experiment contained 72 filler items, in addition to the 36 target items. 24 of the filler 
items contained the determiner more than n for different ns, 24 contained the determiner many, 
and 24 contained the determiner more than n% or more than n/m for different ns and ms. In half 
of the filler trials, the correct answer was true and in the other half it was false.  
The items were presented in surveys in one of 8 pseudo-randomized orders where each pair 
of target items was separated by at least one filler item, and the first item was not a target item. 
The survey, randomization process, and the HTML templates used for this experiment were 
created using the turktools software (Erlewine and Kotek, 2013). The surveys were posted on 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants were paid at the rate of $0.20 for their participation. 
They were asked to indicate their native language, but payment was not contingent on their 
response.  
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Results 
 
Data from 251 native speakers of English who participated in this study was included in the 
analysis. Of those 135 subjects participated in the ‘most’ condition and 116 participated in the 
‘more than half’ condition. Three participants were excluded from the analysis because of low 
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accuracy rates (<75% for the more than n trials);17 nine were excluded because they were non-
native speakers and 62 participants who did not complete one or more trials in the experiment 
were excluded.1819 
Figure 6 shows the average percent of true responses to most statements on the left and to 
more than half statements on the right for the 9 WEBER RATIOS of Experiment 2. Each COLOR 
condition is plotted separately. For all four COLOR conditions, we observe a clear inflection 
point: For Weber ratios > 1 – where the truth-conditions of most and more than half predict that 
the statements in (12)-(13) are true – the percent of true responses is above 65% for the ratio 1.1 
and near 90% for the other data points. For WEBER RATIOS  1 – where the proportional truth-
conditions of most and more than half predict that the corresponding most and more than half 
statements are false – the percent of true responses is very low. 
 
 
Fig. 6 Percent true for most (left) and more than half (right) in Experiment 2 
 
Importantly, we also see in Figure 6 an effect of the COLOR manipulation in the ‘superlative’ 
trials for most but not for more than half such that most yielded more true answers in the 
conditions with WEBER RATIOS  1. To discuss it in more detail, we will examine the four 
graphs in Figure 7. These graphs compare participants’ behavior for each COLOR condition for 
most and more than half. Recall that DETERMINER was a between-subject factor and that 
participants saw the same pictures matched with a most statement in the ‘most’ condition and 
with a more than half statement in the ‘more than half’ condition. Several effects of interest are 
apparent in these graphs.  
 
                                                      
17 Three additional subjects would be excluded if accuracy were calculated based on all the fillers. Here we chose to 
exclude only based on more than n items because they included the same Blue:non-Blue ratios as in the target items.  
18 As an anonymous reviewer points out, this is quite a large number of participants to exclude, but given the fact 
that there were 108 trials in total and that they were all presented on a single page on a computer screen one after 
another, it is not at all surprising that many participants inadvertently skipped one or more trials.  
19 Two additional participants would be excluded if an 80% accuracy rate is used. In addition, if accuracy on all 
filler items is used instead of accuracy only on more than n items, a total of 6 additional participants would be 
excluded (that is, 12 instead of 6, which are excluded with the 75% rate). None of these choices affect the affect the 
statistical findings that we report below: they remain intact under all of these possible exclusion criteria. 
 
 16 
 
 
Fig. 7 Comparison of most and more than half broken down by COLOR conditions 
 
Zooming in on the behavior of most for WEBER RATIOS  1 in the different COLOR 
conditions, we observe a difference in the behavior of most compared to more than half. 
Although all pictures have WEBER RATIOS  1 (false under proportional truth-conditions), some 
pictures have COLOR RATIO > 1 (true under superlative truth-conditions). These pictures are: (a) 
In the UNBALANCED condition: data point 5 (WEBER RATIO = 1; COLOR RATIO = 1.11); (b) In the 
MILDLY BALANCED condition: data points 3-5 (WEBER RATIOS = 0.82, 0.91, 1; COLOR RATIOS = 
1.13, 1.25, 1.42); and (c) In the BALANCED condition: data points 1-5 (WEBER RATIOS = 0.65, 
0.75, 0.82, 0.91, 1; COLOR RATIOS = 1.33, 1.5, 1.5, 1.67, 1.67). As can be observed in Figures 6-
7, we see an increase in true responses to most statements compared to more than half statements 
precisely in these 9 pictures.20.  
Turning now to the 2C graph, which contains data from the same pictures that were used in 
Experiment 1 (see Figure 4), we can clearly observe again the asymmetry property of most: most 
behaves the same as more than half for WEBER RATIOS  1: it is judged true at very low rates, 
close to 0%. For WEBER RATIOS > 1, however, the behavior of most diverges from that of more 
than half. More than half is symmetric and sharply changes from true rates close to 0% to true 
rates close to 100% precisely when its truth-conditions predict that it would: at the first WEBER 
RATIO > 1. Most, on the other hand, has a more gradual increase in true judgments for WEBER 
RATIOS > 1, and even at the highest WEBER RATIO, 1.5, it is still judged true less often than more 
than half. In fact, as the graphs in Figure 7 indicate, in WEBER RATIOS > 1 for all COLOR 
conditions most is consistently judged true less often than more than half for the true Weber 
ratios.21 This is the same pattern that we observed in Experiment 1. We will expand on this point 
in Section 3.3. 
A mixed effects logit model was fit to the data. The model examines the effect of the WEBER 
RATIO (with 9 levels as specified in Table 3 above), COLOR RATIO (with 26 levels as specified in 
Table 3 above) as well as DETERMINER (most vs. more than half) on percent-true. The random 
                                                      
20 One additional finding is an unexpectedly high rate of yes answers to the false trials in the 3C MILDLY 
BALANCED condition and some trials in the 3C UNBALANCED. In section 3.3 we will argue that this is a 
spurious finding which is the result of noisy pictures in those trials and is unrelated to the experimental 
manipulations in Experiment 2.  
21 An inspection of individual subjects reveals that this behavior cannot be attributed to some small subset of 
participants who consistently judged most trials in our true conditions as false.   
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effect structure includes random intercepts for both subjects and items, and by-subject random 
slopes for the effects of WEBER RATIO.23  The fixed effects are summarized in the following 
table. The correlations among the fixed effects are all within ±0.4, with the exception of a strong 
correlation between the main effect of DETERMINER and the main effect of WEBER RATIOS and 
the interaction of these two factors. The fixed effects of the model are summarized in Table 4. 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error z value p 
Intercept -22.1089 1.3689 -16.151 <.001 
DETERMINER 8.2047 1.3492 6.081 <.001 
WEBER RATIOS 20.1878 1.4169 14.248 <.001 
COLOR RATIOS 0.5504 0.4510 1.220 0.222 
DETERMINERWEBER RATIOS -9.4825 1.3114 -7.231 <.001 
DETERMINERCOLOR RATIOS 1.5190 0.2893 5.251 <.001 
Table 4: Summary of the fixed effects in Experiment 2 
 
The results show main effects of DETERMINER and of WEBER RATIO. That is, we find that 
most is verified differently than more than half, but they are both affected by the WEBER RATIO 
manipulation. Additionally, we find a DETERMINERWEBER RATIO interaction, such that more 
than half is affected by the WEBER RATIO manipulation more than most is, and a 
DETERMINERCOLOR RATIO interaction, such that most is affected by the COLOR RATIO 
manipulation more than more than half is.  
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
We see two main effects in Experiment 2: WEBER RATIO and DETERMINER. We find that the 
WEBER RATIO affects the verification of both most and more than half such that the true 
responses to both most and more than half statements increase as the ratio of Blue:non-Blue 
increases. The main effect of DETERMINER indicates that most is judged true more often than 
more than half is. As can be seen in Figure 6, this result is caused by the ‘superlative’ pictures in 
the ‘most’ condition, where we observe that most statements are judged as true more often than 
more than half statements are. In fact, as this observation suggests, the main effect of 
DETERMINER is driven by the DETERMINERCOLOR RATIOS interaction – that is, we see an 
increase in true responses to ‘superlative’ pictures for most but not more than half. The 
DETERMINERWEBER RATIO interaction suggests that WEBER RATIOS contribute more to the 
verification of more than half than to the verification of most. This is so because, as we have 
seen, more factors contribute to the verification of most statements than more than half 
statements, and these factors mediate the contribution of the WEBER RATIOS themselves.  
                                                      
23 A model that also included the ratio of Blue:Red dots in the array did not converge (recall that COLOR RATIOS 
indicate the Blue:Yellow ratio in our pictures. A model that also includes superlative and proportional truth-
conditions reveals similar effects to the ones reported above, but suffers from a high degree of colinearity because of 
the inclusion of the WEBER RATIO and COLOR RATIOS predictions.  
 18 
 
One final result of Experiment 2 is the replication of Experiment 1 in the 2-COLOR condition: 
we again see the asymmetry property of most, where false trials are judged as false close to 
100% of the time, but true trials are judged as true only 90% of the time or less. For more than 
half, by comparison, we find no difference between the verification of false and true trials: both 
are at close to 100%. Furthermore, as in Experiment 1, we see that trials with WEBER RATIO = 1 
are verified as false close to 90% of the time. These results suggest that although participants in 
Experiment 2 were exposed to many more pictures than participants in Experiment 1, the 
diversity of the pictures and the increase in the number of decisions participants had to make did 
not change the nature of the judgments that we observe in the two experiments. That is, we see 
no evidence for a difference in participants’ strategies across the two experiments.   
 
3.3  More discussion: Most in subject position has a genuine superlative reading 
 
In this section we discuss the results of Experiments 1-2 with regard to the debate over the 
correct analysis of most. We will show that postulating a superlative reading of bare most in 
subject position explains the pattern of results observed in the experiments and argue that the 
results are not predicted under the lexical view. 
Recall that the starting point for our experiments was the comparison between a lexical view 
of most and a structural view of most. The lexical view predicts that bare most only has 
proportional truth-conditions while the structural view predicts that bare most is ambiguous 
between the two readings in (14) repeated from above.  
 
(14) a. Most of the dots are blue 
  b. Proportional truth-conditions 
 |blue dots| > |non-blue dots|  
c. Superlative truth-conditions 
     For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots| > |Z dots| 
 
For the superlative reading to be detectable, dot arrays in the ‘superlative’ condition are 
required. That is, we need pictures that make a most statement false under proportional truth-
conditions but true under superlative truth-conditions. If speakers verify most statements only 
according to proportional truth-conditions, we expect them to judge Most of the dots are blue as 
false in such pictures. If they can access superlative truth-conditions, they will be able to judge 
the same statement as true in that case. All speakers are expected to judge a more than half 
statement as false when verified against those same pictures.  
Previous experimental works (Lidz et al. 2011, Tomaszewicz 2011, Heim et al. 2012) have 
shown that most is sensitive to Weber’s law such that most statements are more difficult to verify 
in arrays with close Blue:non-Blue ratios compared to arrays in which the two numerosities are 
further apart. Experiment 1 showed that this result holds not only when the arrays are presented 
for very short durations but also when participants are given as much time as they need to make 
their decision.  
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Experiment 2 built on the WEBER RATIO manipulation of Experiment 1 and compared 
subjects’ behavior in ‘superlative’ pictures in which not only the Blue:non-Blue ratio was varied, 
but also the composition of the non-Blue set. We tested three different ‘superlative’ conditions, 
where the ratios of Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red dots (COLOR RATIOS) were systematically varied. 
Following Weber’s law, we suspected that if participants use a ‘superlative’ verification strategy 
to verify most statements, the ease with which they use this strategy will be affected by the ratios 
of the Blue:Yellow and Blue:Red comparisons. If the ratios are closer to 1, the verification of the 
most statement will be difficult; on the other hand, as the ratios get larger, speakers will have an 
easier time verifying the statement as true under superlative truth-conditions.  
Indeed, Experiment 2 showed that when speakers verify most statements, ‘superlative’ 
pictures were judged true more often than other pictures with the same Blue:non-Blue ratio that 
were false under the superlative reading. Furthermore, there was an increase in the rate of true 
answers to most statements as the COLOR RATIOS increased. This pattern is consistent with the 
view that bare most has a superlative reading and it is inconsistent with the view that bare most 
only has a proportional reading that is truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half.  
Upon closer examination of the ‘superlative’ pictures, we note that although the rates of true 
responses to most statements were clearly above other pictures with the same ratios that were not 
in the ‘superlative’ condition, these rates were overall rather low and, in fact, almost without 
exception below 50%. This seems, prima facie, unexpected on the structural view since this view 
predicts that superlative pictures can be judged as true under the superlative reading of most. One 
might thus expect substantial rates of true responses to ‘superlative’ pictures, reflecting the 
superlative reading of most. However, this prediction can only be made if the two readings of 
most are equally accessible to speakers during the verification task. As was shown by Kotek et 
al. (2011a), the ambiguity of bare most in subject position is in fact heavily unbalanced in favor 
of the proportional reading. That is, the superlative reading of most is latent and often masked by 
the more dominant proportional reading. Moreover, Kotek et al. (2011a) showed that the 
superlative reading of most was only available to about one third of the speakers in each of their 
three experiments. Assuming the same prevalence of the superlative reading in our participants, 
this means that rates of true responses to ‘superlative’ pictures should be lower than the rates of 
true responses to pictures that are true on both the proportional and the superlative reading. In the 
latter case a ‘true’ response is available to all speakers under whichever reading they verify while 
in the former a ‘true’ response is available only to some of the speakers some of the time.  
To further investigate the hypothesis that the superlative reading was only accessible to some 
of the participants in Experiment 2, below we classify participants in the ‘most’ condition in 
Experiment 2 as “proportional” or “superlative” speakers according to whether or not they 
accessed superlative truth-conditions in the verification of most.24 The criterion we use for the 
classification of participants is given in (15).  
                                                      
24 Kotek et al. (2011) suggest that speakers for whom bare most is ambiguous between a proportional and a 
superlative reading use both truth-conditions in the verification of most statements in the same study, rather than 
only using superlative truth-conditions (speakers who consistently only used proportional truth-conditions in the 
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(15) “Superlative” vs. “proportional” classification of participants in Experiment 2 
In proportionally-false pictures: if %-true in 3C-BALANCED > %-true in 3C-UNBALANCED,  
Then superlative. 
Otherwise: proportional 
 
The idea is that if speakers do not use superlative truth-conditions in the verification of bare 
most, they will verify all proportionally-false trials as false with the same error-rate: that is, they 
are not more likely to reply true to pictures in the ‘superlative’ condition than to other pictures 
with the same Weber ratio that are false under the superlative reading. On the other hand, 
speakers who use a superlative verification strategy are more likely to verify a most statement as 
true in ‘superlative’ pictures compared to other pictures with the same Weber ratio that are false 
under superlative truth-conditions. Hence, if speakers replied true more often in the 3C 
BALANCED condition (where all five proportionally-false trials could be judged as true under 
superlative truth-conditions) than in the 3C UNBALANCED condition (where only one 
proportionally-false trial could be judged as true under superlative truth-conditions), we classify 
them as “superlative,” otherwise we classify them as “proportional” speakers.25 
Using the criterion in (15), we find that 79 participants in the most condition are classified as 
“proportional” speakers, and the other 56 are classified as “superlative.” These numbers are 
comparable with Kotek et al. (2011a)’s numbers. Figure 8 shows the percent of true responses to 
all target trials in Experiment 2 broken down by the classification of “proportional” and 
“superlative” most speakers.  
 
 
Fig. 8 Percent true for most-sup (left) and most-prop (right) in Experiment 2 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
verification of most were classified as “proportional” speakers). Therefore, our classification relies on a speaker’s 
ability to use a ‘superlative’ verification strategy, rather than finding speakers who only use such a strategy.  
25 We do not use the 2C codition in the classification, as it is likely to contain less noise than the 3C conditions due 
to the relative simplicity of the task, and hence would make the criterion more inclusive. Also, as the reader will see 
below, we will use the data from the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, which we do not directly manipulate here, 
in our analysis.  
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The classification of speakers in Figure 8 indeed sharpens the results: we find that there is 
little variation among the different COLOR conditions for “proportional” participants, but there is 
a strong effect within the “superlative” participants. In particular, we see that in the case of most-
sup (Figure 8 on the left) all five ‘superlative’ trials in the 3C BALANCED condition, three trials 
in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, and the one trial in the 3C UNBALANCED condition are 
judged true more often than in the case of most-prop (Figure 8 on the right). This mirrors the 
design of the items in Table 3, repeated below for convenience. Specifically, the items that 
exhibit an increase in yes-responses are those that are described in the white region on the left 
side of Table 3. They are the items that use pictures in the ‘superlative’ condition: they are true 
as soon as the number of blue dots is higher than the number of yellow and red dots separately 
(the superlative reading) but false under a proportional reading.  
 
              TC 
COLOR 
Proportional most : False 
 8:12         9:12         9:11           10:11        10:10 
Proportional most : True 
 11:10      11:9         12:9          12:8  
2C 8:12 
(0.67) 
9:12 
(0.75) 
9:11 
(0.82) 
10:11 
(0.91) 
10:10 
(1) 
11:10 
(1.1) 
11:9 
(1.22) 
12:9 
(1.33) 
12:8 
(1.5) 
3C 
UNBALANCED 
8:11:1 
(0.73) 
9:11:1 
(0.86) 
9:10:1 
(0.9) 
10:10:1 
(1) 
10:9:1 
(1.11) 
11:9:1 
(1.22) 
11:8:1 
(1.38) 
12:8:1 
(1.5) 
12:7:1 
(1.71) 
3C  MILDLY 
BALANCED 
8:9:3 
(0.89) 
9:9:3 
(1) 
9:8:3 
(1.13) 
10:8:3 
(1.25) 
10:7:3 
(1.42) 
11:7:3 
(1.57) 
11:6:3 
(1.83) 
12:7:2 
(1.71) 
12:6:2 
(2) 
3C 
BALANCED 
8:6:6 
(1.33) 
9:6:6 
(1.5) 
9:6:5 
(1.5) 
10:6:5 
(1.67) 
10:6:4 
(1.67) 
11:5:5 
(2.2) 
11:5:4 
(2.2) 
12:5:4 
(2.4) 
12:4:4 
(3) 
Table 3: Blue:Yellow:Red dots, and COLOR RATIOS (in brackets) in Experiment 2.  
 
To see whether the classification in (15) identifies internally consistent subgroups of speakers 
in Experiment 2, we can compare the behavior of participants who were classified as 
“proportional” and the behavior of participants in the ‘more than half’ condition. Since both 
groups of speakers are assumed to have verified most and more than half using a proportional 
verification strategy exclusively, and since most and more than half are truth-conditionally 
equivalent for those speakers, we expect to find similar verification behavior for most and more 
than half for those participants. More specifically, we expect similar results to those found in 
Experiment 1, repeated below for convenience. 
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Fig. 4 Average percent of true responses in Experiment 1 (repeated) 
 
Since most is not sensitive to COLOR under the proportional reading, we expect to see similar 
behavior across all four COLOR conditions of Experiment 2 for most and more than half: we 
expect all false items to be verified as false at very high rates for both most and more than half; 
we expect more than half to be verified as true at high rates for all true items, and we expect 
most to be verified as true less often than more than half for those same trials (this reflects the 
asymmetry property of most). Figure 9 shows the comparison of most-prop and more than half, 
broken down by COLOR conditions. 
 
 
Fig. 9 Comparison of most-prop and more than half broken down by COLOR conditions 
 
Several effects can be observed in the graphs in Figure 9. First we observe that the behavior 
of most largely tracks the behavior of more than half for proportionally-false trials. This is as 
expected if the speakers we classified as ‘proportional’ can access only a proportional reading for 
most. Moreover, we see that in proportionally-true trials, most is consistently verified as true less 
often than more than half is. More than half is generally verified as true at close to ceiling rates 
for all true trials, but most is almost never verified at the same rates even at the largest WEBER 
RATIO of 1.5. Finally, we observe that whatever noise that is introduced by the particular items 
used in Experiment 2 (see Figure 5-6 above) affects most and more than half to the same extent. 
This noise is particularly visible in the false trials of the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition and 
some false trials in the 3C UNBALANCED, but importantly it does not have a greater effect on one 
determiner than the other. This justifies the comparisons we have made here between most and 
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more than half and furthermore motivates close scrutiny of deviations in the verification of most 
by “superlative” speakers that go beyond the baseline we have just seen.  
Next let us compare the behavior of participants who were classified as “superlative” with 
the behavior of participants who were classified as “proportional” in the ‘most’ condition. Figure 
10 shows the comparison of most-sup and most-prop, broken down by COLOR conditions.  
 
 
Fig. 10 Comparison of most-sup and most-prop broken down by COLOR conditions 
 
Figure 10 clearly demonstrates the presence of a superlative reading of most for participants 
who were classified as “superlative” speakers. In general, we observe that most-sup is verified as 
true more often than most-prop for all WEBER RATIOS in all COLOR conditions. This property of 
most-sup is particularly pronounced in the ‘superlative’ pictures, where the rates of true 
responses for most-sup are clearly above those of parallel trials for most-prop, which, in turn, 
resemble the rates of true responses observed earlier for more than half. Furthermore, we observe 
that the rate of yes responses to ‘superlative’ pictures increases as the COLOR RATIO increases, as 
expected based on the results of Experiment 1 as well as the results of Lidz et al. (2011).  
This finding is precisely what is predicted if bare most has a latent superlative reading when 
it occurs in subject position that is accessible to some speakers (the “superlative” speakers, most-
sup), but it is unexpected if most does not have such a reading. If such a reading did not exist, we 
would expect to only see behavior consistent with most-prop but not most-sup. However, we see 
a clear difference in the judgment patterns of “superlative” and “proportional” speakers precisely 
in those pictures that correspond to the ‘superlative’ condition – that is, pictures that can be 
judged as true under superlative truth-conditions even though they are false under proportional 
truth-condition.  
It is particularly illuminating to compare the behavior of the two speaker groups in the 3C 
MILDLY BALANCED condition: this condition did not enter into the calculation used to classify 
speakers into the two groups in (15), and hence represents the effect of this classification 
independent of the data used in the classification itself. We observe that the four (proportionally 
and superlatively) true ratios in this condition were verified as true with similar rates by 
proportional and superlative speakers. Moreover, we can clearly observe that the first two ratios 
on the left (false under both readings of most) were verified as false at similar rates for both 
speaker groups but the next three ratios, all ‘superlative’ conditions, exhibit a much higher rate 
of true responses in the “superlative” group than in the “proportional” group. Recall that, as we 
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observed in Figure 9, the increase in true rates in these pictures for “proportional” speakers is 
parallel to that observed for more than half and hence likely reflects noise present in our items 
rather than superlative verification behavior. The increase observed beyond that for “superlative” 
pictures cannot be similarly attributed to noise and rather corresponds to a superlative 
verification strategy.  
A logit mixed effects model indeed confirms an interaction between Speaker-Type and 
COLOR ratios, such that COLOR ratios better predict the verification behavior of speakers who 
were classified as ‘superlative’ as opposed to those who were classified as ‘proportional.’ The 
model predicted percent yes from Speaker-Type and COLOR ratios for the first five data points 
on the left in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition (all ratios that are false under proportional 
truth-conditions of most). The random effect structure was the maximal supported by the design 
of Experiment 2 and included by-item intercepts and by-participant slopes and intercepts for 
Speaker-Type and COLOR ratios. The model also yielded a significant main effect of COLOR 
ratios, but this main effect was highly correlated with the interaction and we therefore do not put 
explanatory weight on it. All other correlations among fixed effects were all within ±0.15. This is 
consistent with the results apparent in the graph in Figure 10 and predicted by theories of most 
that treat it as a superlative construction. The fixed effects of the model are summarized in Table 
5: 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error z value p 
Intercept -12.484 1.330 -9.385 <.001 
Speaker-Type - 2.846 2.088 -1.363 0.1728 
Color ratios  9.731 1.133 8.591 <.001 
Speaker-TypeColor ratios  4.790 1.770 2.706 <.01 
Table 5: Summary of the fixed effects for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED with most 
 
Finally, we note that if participants in the ‘more than half’ condition are classified using the 
same method that was used above for most in (15), no superlative behavior is found in the data. 
This classification yields 94 subjects who are classified as “proportional” and 22 who are 
classified as “superlative.” As can be observed in Figure 11, the “proportional” behavior in the 
graph on the right was made sharper by this classification. However, we find no indication of a 
superlative verification strategy for the participants who were classified as “superlative”. That is, 
we observe that the verification behavior for these speakers is generally more noisy; moreover, 
and importantly, we do not observe a selective increase in yes responses to trials in the 
‘superlative’ condition, namely all five trials in the 3C BALANCED condition, three trials in the 
3C MILDLY BALANCED condition, and one trial in the 3C UNBALANCED condition.  
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Fig. 11 Percent true for “mth-sup” (left) and “mth-prop” (right) in Experiment 2 
 
A mixed effects logit model predicting percent yes from Speaker-Type and COLOR ratios for 
the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition for the more than half participants (parallel to the one 
described for the most participants above) confirms this finding. We find a main effect of COLOR 
ratios, but no effect of Speaker-Type and no interaction. That is, we observe only one type of 
speaker in this data, unlike the finding for most. The main effect of the COLOR ratios indicates 
that knowing the ratio improves the model predictions compared to having no information about 
the pictures at all. This is as expected, given that the COLOR ratios (correlated with superlative 
truth-conditions) and the WEBER ratios (correlated with proportional truth-conditions) converge 
for 6 out of the 9 ratios in the 3C MILDLY BALANCED condition. The fixed effects of this model 
are summarized in Table 6: 
 
Predictor Coefficient Standard Error z value p 
Intercept -23.215 3.513 -6.609 <.001 
Speaker-Type -6.263 5.434 -1.153 0.249 
Color ratios 16.442 2.688 6.117 <.001 
Speaker-TypeColor ratios  5.803 3.906 1.486 0.137 
Table 6: Summary of the fixed effects for the 3C MILDLY BALANCED with more than half 
 
We can thus verify that the classification we have used above is parsimonious in grouping 
the noise in Experiment 2 together with the “superlative” data. Furthermore, as predicted by the 
truth-conditions of more than half, no superlative behavior is observed even for those 
participants who were classified as “superlative” by the criterion in (15). Hence, the superlative 
behavior we observe for most is not an artifact of our classification of subjects or of the design of 
our experiment. Rather, it is genuinely attributable to the truth-conditional import of bare most 
and is explained under a decompositional approach to most while it is not predicted by the lexical 
ambiguity approach to most. 
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4. General Discussion 
 
In this section, we summarize the empirical results of Experiment 2 and their impact on the 
debate as to the correct analysis of most. We then discuss differences between most and more 
than half that emerge from both of our experiments, and, finally, we discuss the differences 
between the findings in our study and the findings of Lidz et al. (2011), who used a similar 
manipulation to the one in the present study but did not find any evidence of sensitivity of most 
to the number of colors in the pictures against which the most statements were verified.  
 
4.1  Proportional and Superlative truth-conditions for bare most 
 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to test whether speakers can verify sentences like (16a) using 
superlative truth-conditions as in (16c) in addition to the proportional truth-conditions described 
in (16b) 
 
(16) a. Most of the dots are blue 
  b. Proportional truth-conditions 
 |blue dots| > |non-blue dots|  
c. Superlative truth-conditions 
     For each non-blue color Z, |blue dots| > |Z dots| 
 
The data is quite clear. We saw that even when pooling data across all participants the rates of 
true responses to ‘superlative’ pictures (pictures that were true under the reading described in 
(16c) but false under the reading in (16b)) show sensitivity to the COLOR manipulation, namely 
to the difference between the number of blue dots and the number of dots in the most numerous 
non-blue color (the blue-to-highest-non-blue ratio). This is a signature property of the superlative 
reading and thus indicates that at least some of our participants verified the pictures using the 
truth-conditions as described in (16c). It cannot be explained if speakers had only access to a 
proportional reading, (16b), since under that reading there should only be sensitivity to the blue-
to-non-blue ratio. Furthermore, we have seen that classifying participants into “superlative” and 
“proportional” speakers sharpens the data considerably: for the “superlative” group (about 40% 
of our participants) the rates of true responses to superlative pictures mirror perfectly the white 
portion of Table 3 indicating that they have a strong preference to verify the arrays using a blue-
to-highest-non-blue strategy. No such strategy was detected for the “proportional” group. We 
conclude from these observations that at least for our “superlative” speakers bare most in subject 
position is ambiguous between a proportional and a genuine superlative construal.  
The fact that bare most in subject position can have a genuine superlative reading (in addition 
to the proportional reading) is expected under the view where most is in all its incarnations a 
superlative construction which gives rise to proportional or superlative truth-conditions 
depending on how the comparison class is set. It is not expected under the view where most is 
simply ambiguous between a lexical determiner with proportional truth-conditions and a 
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superlative construction with superlative truth conditions, since on that view bare most is always 
unambiguously proportional. Our data shows, however, that bare most itself is ambiguous. This 
means that a lexical ambiguity approach has to stipulate that bare most itself is ambiguous 
between a proportional meaning and a superlative meaning.26 This proliferation of lexical 
ambiguity is an unwelcome consequence, especially since it offers no principled account of why 
most is ambiguous between these two meanings rather than any other possible (determiner) 
meanings or why most is ambiguous between a proportional and a superlative meaning while 
similar determiners such as more than half are unambiguously proportional. 
In this connection, it is important to stress that the superlative-proportional ambiguity also 
arises in other languages, for example in German, as discussed in Hackl (2009) and Slavic as 
discussed in Krasikova (2011), Szabolcsi (2012) and Pancheva (forthcoming) and elsewhere. 
This fact, too, speaks against the lexical ambiguity account as it offers no general perspective on 
the systematic (un)availability of proportional and superlative meanings for expressions that 
contain superlative morpho-syntax. Moreover, just like in English, only determiners that contain 
a superlative morpheme seem to give rise to this ambiguity across languages: quantifiers such as 
more than half do not exhibit such an ambiguity.27  
 
4.2  Most vs. More than half 
 
In this section we return to the discussion of the asymmetry behavior of most, which is not 
apparent in the behavior more than half in Experiments 1-2. In both experiments we saw that in 
the 2C condition,28 the verification behavior of more than half resembles a step-function that 
changes sharply from true rates close to zero for all false trials to true rates close to 100% for all 
                                                      
26 For example, an anonymous reviewer suggests the following custom-tailored lexical ambiguity theory:  
 
(i) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff for all ‘appropriate’ Y  A – B, | A BY 
- Dominant: Y can only be A – B itself 
- Latent: Y can range over salient subsets of A – B   
 
Note, however, that this proposal looks rather similar to the superlative-based treatment proposed in Hackl 
(2009) and summarized in (4b) and (5b) above. It differs only in that no reference to degrees or to the degree 
quantifier expressed by –est is acknowledged. As such, it rather begs the question why its meaning is related to the 
meaning of the superlative construction the most. Furthermore, this account does not give a principled explanation 
as to why only these two interpretations are attested, or in particular, why interpretations such as Y = the smallest 
subset of A–B, or Y = two or more subsets of A–B, are unattested, despite being in principle sensible. 
27 To be sure, the decompositional view of most faces remaining challenges, as noted by an anonymous reviewer. In 
particular: (i) the presence/absence of the definite article; (ii) the tendency of most but not the most to have a generic 
interpretation when combining with a plural noun, and to prefer a partitive construction in episodic sentences. These 
issues are beyond the scope of this paper, but see Pancheva (forthcoming) for a recent attempt to explain the 
interaction with the definite article.  
28 The 2C condition is the only condition where there is no interference from the COLOR manipulation. Because of 
this complication in the other COLOR conditions, we restrict the discussion above to this one condition. However, 
the same observation holds for all conditions for participants who we classified as “proportional” most speakers in 
Section 3.3. 
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true trials. For most, we observe parallel low true rates for all false trials but the true rates are 
lower than those of more than half for all true trials. Furthermore, the first true ratio for most is 
judged as true only 77%, while other ratios are judged as true 90% or above. Although never 
formally recognized or explained in any previous literature on most, the asymmetry property has 
been observed for most in prior experimental work (Yosef Grodzinsky, p.c.).  
We believe that this finding can be related to an observation regarding the pragmatics of the 
use of most and more than half. In particular, more than half is used for proportions that are 
closer to (and above) 50%, while most tends to imply proportions that are significantly higher 
than 50% (Peterson 1979, Westerstahl 1985, Horn 2005; cf. Ariel 2004 for a similar observation 
for the Hebrew rov ‘most’).29 This observation has recently been verified through corpus work in 
Solt (2013). Solt examined the use of most and more than half in the Corpus of Contemporary 
American English (COCA) (Davies 2008), and found that more than half was typically used to 
describe percentages between fifty and sixty-five percent, while most was rarely used for 
percentages below sixty percent. Below are some examples from the COCA corpus, taken from 
Solt (2013).  
 
(17) a. The survey showed that most students (81.5%) do not use websites for math-related 
assignments (Education, 129(1), pp. 56-79, 2008) 
b. Most respondents – 63 percent – said the best movie for date night is a comedy 
(Redbook, 208(6), p. 158, 2007) 
c. Most Caucasian grandparents were married (67%), had attained an education level above 
high school (64%), and lived on an annual household income above $20,000 (74%). 
(Journal of Instructional Psychology, 24(2), p. 119, 1997) 
 
(18) a. More than half of respondents (55%) say that making money is more important now than 
it was five years ago (Money, 21(3), p. 72, 1992) 
b. More than half of the respondents (60%) earned Ph.D. degrees (Physical Educator, 
53(4), p. 170, 1996) 
c. And while more than half of us grill year-round (57 percent), summertime is 
overwhelmingly charcoal time (Denver Post, 24/5/2000) 
 
Solt (2013) describes several additional differences between most and more than half that 
stem from the kinds of nouns that these two determiners normally combine with (kind vs. group-
denoting), the overall higher frequency in the corpus of most compared to more than half, and 
their normal usage to describe generic vs. ‘survey results’ readings, respectively. Solt also shows 
that most is used more often with vague and uncountable domains, while more than half appears 
less compatible with such domains, as illustrated in (19) (also from Solt 2013).30 Solt proposes a 
                                                      
29 Here we will not discuss previous attempts to build this property of most into its semantics.  
30 For related observations about most and the most and their counterparts in Hungarian, Russian, and German see 
Szabolcsi (2012). 
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formal account of these differences between most and more than half based on the interaction of 
their logical forms with different measurement scale structure. 
 
(19) a.   But like most things, obesity is not spread equally across social classes 
b. ?But like more than half of things, obesity is not spread equally across social classes  
 
We see, then, that although most and more than half are truth-conditionally equivalent, they 
are used in different contexts. This finding is consistent with the results of Experiments 1-2. 
First, both determiners are false under the exact same conditions, and hence we expect them to 
be judged as false at very high rates for all false conditions. However, while both determiners are 
true in all the same cases, they are not used in the same way: more than half is more often used 
for proportions that are close to fifty percent, and most is more often used for proportions 
significantly higher than fifty percent. This fact may have contributed to the difference in rates of 
true judgments for most and more than half: the rate of true responses to our trials may reflect the 
felicity of the corresponding statement in the context.  
As we have seen, participants verify more than half statements as true at very high rates for 
all true ratios, including those that are very close to WEBER RATIO 1: these are contexts in which 
more than half is often used felicitously. On the other hand, most is used less often in such 
contexts, and hence most is judged as true less often in these cases. As the Weber ratio increases, 
the percent of speakers who find the most statement felicitous increases too. Furthermore, since 
the highest proportion of Blue dots found in our pictures was only sixty percent of the total 
number of dots, we can understand why even at the highest WEBER RATIO in our experiments, 
more than half is consistently judged as true more often than most for all COLOR conditions: as 
Solt shows, sixty percent is still within the range of percentages for which speakers tend to prefer 
to use more than half as opposed to most.  
To conclude, the asymmetry property of most seems to be related to the pragmatics of its 
usage. Although most is true in the same cases as more than half (under proportional truth-
conditions), it is less often used to describe pictures with the proportions that were found in our 
experiments compared to more than half. Furthermore, it is predicted that both determiners will 
be clearly judged as false in all false pictures because the conditions of use of both determiners 
entail that both most and more than half statements are infelicitous in such cases. Finally, we 
note that our data does not speak to the question of whether the distributional facts of most are 
the underlying cause of the asymmetry we observed or whether the semantic properties of most, 
e.g. along the lines of Solt (2013), are responsible both the distributional data and the asymmetry 
in our results.31  
 
                                                      
31 An anonymous reviewer asks whether the most exhibits the same asymmetry property that bare most does. If only 
one determiner exhibits this property but not the other, the decompositional approach to most will face a challenge 
explaining this fact. We note that Kotek et al. (2011b) show that outside of a particular syntactic configuration the 
most in subject position is infelicitous for many English speakers, making it impossible to test the most in the same 
experimental setting used for bare most in the present paper.  
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4.3. Comparison with Lidz et al. (2011)  
 
In this section we review the results of a previous sentence verification study of most conducted 
by Lidz et al. (2011), which, even though similar to our study in many ways, obtained different 
findings than those we reported above.32 Although the explicit goal of Lidz et al. was not to test 
whether bare most has a superlative reading in subject position, their study directly bears on the 
question of whether such a reading exists. In particular, while we have found that most is 
ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading, the results 
of Lidz et al. suggest that most is unambiguous and has only the proportional reading. Below we 
survey Lidz et al.’s study and discuss the source for the conflicting findings of this study and the 
results we reached above. We argue that the source of the difference lies in the different task 
demands and in the way the results of the study were interpreted.  
 
4.3.1 A brief summary of Lidz et al. (2011) 
 
Lidz et al. (2011) examine the verification of the question Are most of the dots blue? with respect 
to dot arrays with varying complexities. Arrays varied along two dimensions: (a) The WEBER 
RATIO of Blue:non-Blue dots (1:2, 2:3. 3:4, and 4:5; in half of the cases the Blue dots 
outnumbered the non-Blue dots); and (b) The number of COLORS used in the arrays (2, 3, 4, or 
5). The goal of the study was to test a prediction of the standard Generalized Quantifier Theory 
approach to most in (20) when combined with the hypothesis that when determining the 
truth/falsity of a sentence, speakers are biased towards using verification strategies that employ 
the operations that are specified as part of the truth-conditional import of the statement (Lidz et 
al.’s Interface Transparency Thesis, the ITT).  
 
(20) ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff | A     Standard GQT 
 
Lidz et al. (2011) argue that given (20) and the ITT speakers are expected to employ a 
verification strategy that enumerates the Blue dots and the non-Blue dots, and compares the two 
numbers. To do that, Lidz et al. argue, it is necessary to select and attend to the non-Blue set. 
However, it has been shown that (at least under extremely short exposure times) it is impossible 
for the visual system to select a set of objects based on a “negative” feature such as non-Blue 
(Wolfe 1998; Treisman and Gormican 1988; Treisman and Souther 1985; see discussion in Lidz 
et al. 2011). Instead, in order to select the non-Blue set, it is necessary to select the subsets of 
homogeneously colored dots that make up the non-Blue set. Lidz et al. reason that this step of 
selecting each subset of homogeneously colored dots should be sensitive to the number of colors 
used in the arrays. Therefore, if determining the cardinalities of all the homogeneously colored 
                                                      
32 The results of Lidz et al. (2011) also differ from the findings in Kotek et al. (2011), which were consistent with 
the findings of our Experiment 2: that bare most in subject position is ambiguous between a dominant proportional 
reading and a latent superlative reading.  
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subsets of non-Blue dots is part of the verification procedure of most statements, increasing the 
number of colors in the arrays should make the verification of most increasingly difficult. 
To test this prediction, Lidz et al.’s study presented their dot arrays for only 150ms. This 
made a verification strategy based on counting all the dots individually impossible and it made it 
impossible for the visual system to directly select the non-Blue set. Instead, participants had to 
rely on estimating the cardinality of whatever sets they used in the verification process. 
Importantly, estimating the cardinality of a set is a process whose accuracy is governed by the 
Weber ratio and for which there exists well-established psychophysical models, (e.g. Pica et al. 
2004). Moreover, as Halberda et al. (2006) have shown, the number of sets whose cardinality 
participants can successfully estimate at such brief exposure times is limited: participants can 
estimate the cardinality of the set of all dots and, in addition, up to two homogenously colored 
subsets of dots. Thus, when a task requires estimating more than two subsets in addition to the 
total set, performance drops off markedly. Based on this observation, Lidz et al. reasoned that 
verifying most statements using a strategy that requires estimating the size of each 
homogenously colored subset of dots individually should be markedly more difficult and no 
longer be predicted by the Weber ratio when the number of colors used in the array is 3, 4, or 5.33 
However, this is not what they found in their study. Rather, their results, shown in Figure 12 
from Lidz et al. (2011), indicate a marked insensitivity to the number of colors in the array as 
well as a strong dependency on the Weber ratio. 
 
 
Fig. 12 Results of the most experiment in Lidz et al. (2011)34 
 
Since their results show no effect of COLOR, Lidz et al. (2011) conclude that the composition 
of the non-Blue set could not have played a direct role in the verification of the most statements. 
To account for this insensitivity to the number of colors used in the arrays, Lidz et al. propose the 
                                                      
33 Whether performance should break down when there are 3 colors in the array or only when there are 4 or more is 
somewhat unclear given the results in Halberda et al. (2006). Whatever the answer to this question may be, this does 
not change the interpretation of the experiment in Lidz et al. since there was no effect of color across all levels.   
34 Figure reproduced with permission of the authors.  
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analysis of most in (21b) in place of the more traditional Generalized Quantifier Theory 
treatment in (21a).35   
 
(21) a.   ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff | A     Standard GQT 
b.   ⟦most⟧(A)(B) = 1 iff | A BA | A  B   Lidz et al. (2011) 
 
Lidz et al. (2011) argue that under the ITT, (21b) differs from (21a) in that it only requires 
determining the cardinality of all the dots in the array ( | A | ) and the cardinality of the Blue set 
(A  B. With these two quantities established, the cardinality of the non-Blue set can now 
be calculated as A | A  BThat is, the non-Blue set need not be estimated as the sum of 
the cardinalities of all the homogeneously colored non-Blue subsets. 
The specific assumptions underlying this argument deserve closer scrutiny, which we will 
return to in section 4.3.3. For now, however, we simply point out that the lack of an effect of 
COLOR in Lidz et al.’s (2011) experiment implies that bare most could not have been verified 
using a superlative verification strategy. Such a strategy would have required the estimation of 
each homogeneously colored subset of the non-Blue set separately, and that behavior is predicted 
to be sensitive to COLOR. Instead, only proportional truth-conditions must have been available to 
participants in Lidz et al.’s experiment. This appears to be in conflict with the present study. As 
our experiment shows, superlative truth-conditions are in principle available to some speakers 
who verify most statements. Lidz et al.’s proposal (just like the standard GQT treatment), 
however, only allows for proportional truth-conditions. As such, it is a version of the lexical 
view of most and so cannot account for the superlative behavior found in our results in a 
straightforward way. 
 
4.3.2. Design and tasks differences between the present study and Lidz et al. (2011)  
 
In this section we discuss critical differences between the study reported here and Lidz et al.’s 
(2011) and argue that the specific design and tasks demands of the experiment in Lidz et al. 
played a critical role in obtaining the result that the COLOR manipulation had no effect. This, in 
turn, casts doubt on the generalizability of the results and on the robustness of the conclusions 
drawn from that study.  
Recall that both studies explored the verification of bare most in subject position through 
experiments that manipulated the COLOR and WEBER RATIO of the dots in the pictures against 
which a most statement was verified. The present study also used a DETERMINER manipulation 
to compare the behavior of most to that of more than half. Lidz et al. (2011) found an effect of 
WEBER RATIOs but no effect of COLOR, such that all four COLOR conditions in their experiment 
                                                      
35 To make this argument Lidz et al. rely on additional assumptions that provide a bridge between the two 
hypotheses in (21) and how speakers verify statements in general. An in-depth discussion of these assumptions 
would lead us to far afield here, and it is peripheral to our main argument—that most must be analyzed as a 
superlative structure—because both (21a-b) are inconsistent with the superlative behavior observed in our study.  
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were verified with similar levels of accuracy. The present study found an effect of WEBER 
RATIOS as well but in addition it also found an effect of COLOR for most but not more than half, 
such that most statements were consistently judged as true significantly more often for 
‘superlative’ pictures than for pictures with the same WEBER RATIOS that were false under the 
superlative reading. A similar effect of COLOR was also found in Kotek et al. (2011a), who used 
a COLOR manipulation with WEBER RATIOS very close to 1 and found that pictures that 
contained three colors and were true only under the superlative reading were judged as true more 
often than corresponding pictures with the same ratios that contained just two colors. This result 
led Kotek et al. (2011a) as well as the present study to adopt a view of most that is compatible 
with the structural view of most, under which most is the superlative form of many (Hackl 2009).   
We see, then, that both Lidz et al. and the present study use a COLOR manipulation and a 
WEBER RATIO manipulation. However, only the present study, following Kotek et al., also uses a 
DETERMINER manipulation; this manipulation helps to ensure that whatever results are obtained 
for most can be attributed to the semantics and verification procedures associated with most, 
rather than some general difficulty related to the design of the experiments or to its participants. 
If that were the case, we would expect the verification of more than half to be affected in a 
similar manner to that of most. Additionally, if most is unambiguously a proportional determiner 
and truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half, as predicted by the lexical view of most, we 
again expect any experimental manipulation to affect these two determiners equally.  
One important source of difference between the experiments is the mode of presentation of 
dot arrays in them. We saw that the experiments in the present study allowed participants 
unlimited time to make their decision. The Lidz et al. experiment, on the other hand, used a flash 
presentation method: participants saw the dot arrays for 150ms and were asked to answer the 
question: Are most of the dots blue? based on whatever information they could gather within that 
time frame. Moreover, participants were always asked the very same question: Are most of the 
dots blue?, where the color of the dots was not varied and no fillers were used, for 400 trials in 
this experiment without using filler items. We would like to suggest that this design and the 
specific tasks demands that came with it biased participants toward using a verification strategy 
such as the one derivable from combining the ITT with (21b). The flash presentation allows 
participants to gather enough information to support a verification strategy compatible with 
proportional truth-conditions in all of the experimental conditions, irrespective of whether there 
were two, three, four, or five colors in a given array. A superlative verification strategy requiring 
estimating the number of dots in each color, by contrast, was only supported in half of the 
conditions - when the arrays contained two or three colors but not when they contained four or 
five colors.36 Given that participants encountered the very same question 400 times in a row, it is 
likely that participants were strategic and adopted a verification procedure that could guarantee a 
successful verification of the question in all cases – that is, a strategy compatible with 
                                                      
36 Recall that following work by Halberda et al. (2006), in conditions like those that obtained in the experiment in 
Lidz et al. (2011), participants are able to estimate the total number of dots in the array, and additionally the sizes of 
up to two homogeneously colored subsets of dots.  
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proportional truth-conditions.37 Thus, we think the extreme task demands imposed on 
participants in this study cast doubt on whether the verification strategy that was observed indeed 
reflects the underlying components of the truth-conditions of most and the way that they are 
stated, as assumed by Lidz et al. Instead, the behavior displayed by participants might reflect a 
less transparent translation of the truth-conditions of most into a strategy that could guarantee 
successful verification of the most statement in all experimental conditions, regardless of the 
specific composition of a given dot array. Thus, while the proposal in (21b) might indeed 
correctly reflect the behavior of participants in Lidz et al.’s study, it is not obvious that it should 
be viewed as reflecting the underlying truth-conditions of most outside of Lidz et al.’s 
experimental settings.  
To put it differently, Lidz et al.’s argument that the semantic import of most is to be stated as 
in (21b) rather than as in (21a) or, for that matter, in terms of a superlative semantics as we argue 
here, relies on stating the ITT in a way that does not take the specific task demands under which 
speakers might engage in verification into account. This is unrealistic. Moreover, it can create 
the false impression, as is the case here, of having to account for conflicting data. A more 
realistic version of the ITT, which avoids drawing inconsistent inferences about the underlying 
semantics of an expression based on conflicting data sets, would make the ITT sensitive to the 
task demands. Thus, minimally an amendment of the following sort is in order: 
 
(22) The modified Interface Transparency Thesis (mITT) 
When determining the truth/falsity of a statement in a given situation, speakers exhibit a 
bias towards using verification procedures that employ operations specified as part of the 
truth-conditional import of the statement, as supported by the task demands brought about 
by that situation. 
 
Amending the ITT to include sensitivity to specific task demands makes inferring semantic 
properties of expressions from verification data less direct than Lidz et al. assumed. In particular, 
for a given linguistic expression there may be several kinds of “default” verification strategies 
and speakers might choose among those according to the specific experimental conditions. Thus, 
for each experimental setting, verification data is explainable only by combining hypotheses 
about the semantics of the studied expression with a (ideally independently justified) theory of 
the task.38 Consequently, drawing inferences about the core semantic properties that might 
underlie all the uses of a certain linguistic expression under all experimental conditions must be 
based on sets of experimental results and must take into account the effects of the specific task 
demands.  
                                                      
37 An anonymous reviewer proposes further that given the lack of fillers in the Lidz et al. (2011) study, it is possible 
that participants in that study interpreted the task as simply deciding whether or not there are more blue dot than 
other dots in the arrays presented to them, effectively ignoring the prompt that they were given.  
38 This is, of course, generally true for all behavior that linguistic theories aim to explain, and not just for sentence 
verification paradigms (cf. Marantz 2005).  
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Conflicting experimental results represent a challenge, but we argue that in the present case a 
resolution can be found by assuming that the underlying semantics of most is superlative in 
nature. Under this assumption, the results of the present study (as well as those reported in Kotek 
et al. 2011a) are straightforwardly explained and the results of Lidz et al. (2011) can be 
explained under the assumption that speakers strategically worked with the proportional reading, 
which, moreover, following Lidz et al., can be represented as in (21b). On the view that the 
semantics of most is underlyingly as in (21b), only the data in Lidz et al. is explained. The 
superlative behavior we found in the present study is, however, not understandable on those 
terms alone since the task demands of our study do not impinge on a verification strategy that is 
based on (21b). Thus, there is, prima facie, no reason to expect that speakers should not employ 
the same verification strategy that they did in Lidz et al.’s experiment.  
 
4.3.3. A further difference between the present study and Lidz et al. (2011)  
 
In the previous subsection we argued that the main inconsistency between the present study and 
the Lidz et al. study – the presence/absence of an effect of COLOR – is resolved once we assume 
a superlative semantics for most in conjunction with a modified ITT, which allows for the 
specific task demands in a verification setting to influence which verification procedure is 
chosen by speakers as the strategically most advantageous. The current section briefly discusses 
another, somewhat less critical inconsistency between the two studies.  
Recall from the discussion of Experiment 1 that in the case of most we observe an asymmetry 
between the rates of yes responses for Weber ratios above 1 and the rates of no responses for 
Weber ratios below 1: while the latter are close to zero for all relevant ratios (and are no different 
from the rates of no responses for more than half for all those Weber ratios) the former are lower 
than the corresponding yes rates for more than half, for all ratios except the highest one. 
Moreover, we saw that the rate of yes responses for WEBER RATIO 1 was close to zero, indicating 
that speakers were confidently judging the most statement to be false in this case. Neither 
observation is apparent in Lidz et al.’s reported data (see Figure 12). The reasons are twofold: 
First, Lidz et al. did not directly test how speakers verify dot arrays with WEBER RATIO 1. 
Second, they assumed that the verification process of most statements can be faithfully modeled 
as a symmetric discrimination task between two quantities represented by the Analog Numbers 
System (ANS).39 Under this assumption, it is possible to assume that the rate of yes responses at 
WEBER RATIO 1 is 50%, since two equal ANS quantities are maximally confusable. Moreover, it 
is now legitimate to collapse response rates for Weber ratios and their multiplicative inverses, as 
Lidz et al. indeed do, to produce the data that was subsequently modeled using an independently 
provided psycho-physical model of the ANS.  
                                                      
39 Modelling the verification task as a symmetric discrimination task means, informally speaking, that participants 
were assumed to determine in each verification trial whether n > m or m > n (n represeing the estimated cardinality 
of blue dots and m the estimated cardinality of the non-blue dots). 
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Clearly, our results do not support Lidz et al.’s assumptions underlying their statistical 
analysis. We determined the rate of yes responses to WEBER RATIO 1 empirically rather than a 
priori and found that it is in fact close to zero, not to 50%. Moreover, we saw for the 2 COLOR 
cases that the rates of yes response gradually increase for Weber ratios above 1, while the rates 
for no responses seem to be close to zero for any Weber ratio below or equal to 1. Finally, we 
saw that the rates of yes responses for the 3 COLOR items in the superlative conditions of 
Experiment 2 exhibit a similar gradual increase (depending on the blue to highest non-blue ratio) 
while the 3 COLOR items that were false under both the proportional and superlative construal 
were again all close to zero. These observations clearly indicate that Lidz et al’s assumptions 
about the nature of the data are not justified in our case. This means that Lidz et. al’s approach to 
modeling the data cannot be used either as it would distort our results.40 More generally, the 
experimental results in the present paper cast doubt on the generalizability of Lidz et al.’s 
approach and on the generalizability of the conclusions that were drawn by Lidz et al. about the 
semantic properties of most on the basis of how the data was modeled.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper introduced new evidence regarding the correct semantics of bare most. Previous 
sentence verification studies of most have found diverging results: Kotek et al. (2011a) find that 
most is ambiguous between a dominant proportional reading and a latent superlative reading, 
while the findings in Lidz et al. (2011) are consistent with most being unambiguously 
proportional and truth-conditionally equivalent to more than half.  
Here, we presented the results of a study that combined the manipulations of the two 
previous studies and showed that bare most indeed has a superlative reading in subject position. 
In particular, we find an effect of the number of colors in the pictures for most but not for more 
than half precisely in those pictures that were true under superlative truth-condition (but false 
under proportional truth-conditions). This reflects the fact that most, but not more than half, can 
be verified using a verification strategy that is compatible with superlative truth-conditions.  
This result is compatible with a decompositional analysis of most, according to which both 
the most and bare most are built from the same basic ingredients – a gradable predicate MANY 
and the superlative operator -est – but project different LFs as e.g. in Hackl (2009). The results 
are unexpected under the lexical view of most, where bare most and the most are unrelated 
lexical items, with bare most exclusive expressing proportional semantics and the most 
exclusively expressing superlative semantics.  
We explained the differences between the findings of our study and Lidz et al.’s (2011) study 
as stemming from differences in the task demands that may have biased participants in the latter 
towards using a verification strategy that is only compatible with proportional truth-condition. 
                                                      
40 For instance, collapsing across Weber ratios and their multiplicative inverses in the 3 COLOR ‘superlative’ 
conditions would lead to lower accuracy rates for each ratio. Consequently, the ANS-based model used by Lidz et 
al. would underestimate the discriminability of the two quantities that are compared by the model. 
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We have argued that such a strategy is guaranteed to succeed in all trials in Lidz et al.’s study, 
while a strategy compatible with superlative truth-conditions is expected to fail in 50% of the 
trials. This makes it unsurprising that no evidence of a superlative reading of bare most was 
found in that study. In turn, this means that the absence of any evidence indicative of a 
superlative construal of bare most cannot be taken to mean that bare most has only a proportional 
meaning.  
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